This paper begins by considering the specific position of philosophy on culture: philosophy is part of culture as well as being a reflection of the whole complex. Thus, culture finds in philosophy its own meta-cultural account. One of the results achieved by this philosophical approach might be the diagnosis of the cultural split and the symptoms of anthropological regress. On the other hand, the example of Michel de Certeau's work shows us that from this point of view it is possible to develop philosophical anthropology as a performative discipline, studying the activities of transformation, and appropriation at the level of everyday life. This anthropological approach leads us to an awareness of the principal openness of the cultural field and even to a new understanding of balkanization.
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When we attempt to delineate the concept of culture, the characteristics that denote its larger extent are the first to appear. Culture comprises all that is social and has no natural origin in the life of a human being and society. In his Structural Anthropology, Claude Lévi-Strauss refers to Taylor's definition of the concept, according to which, culture is "That complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (in Lévi-Strauss 1963, 356) . As Lévi-Strauss adds, this definition is based on the traditional differentiation made between humans and animals that takes on the form of the opposition between nature and culture. In an area delineated in this way, the boundaries between the individual zones disappear, so agricultural techniques are cultural manifestations in the same way that songs and customs are. Thus, only characteristics associated with human beings are left beyond the boundaries of culture that originated in nature.
Using this understanding of culture Lévi-Strauss then extends it to include the subjects of cultural anthropology and the relationship to social anthropology: Customs, beliefs, and institutions are then seen as techniques comparable to other techniques, though no doubt more purely intellectual-techniques promoting social life and making social life possible, just as the techniques of agriculture make it possible to satisfy man's need for food, or those of cloth making to protect him from the rigors of the weather. Social anthropology denotes merely the study of social organization-an extremely important subject, but one of the many subjects making up cultural anthropology (Lévi-Strauss 1963, 357) .
However, we are not concerned only with the extent of cultural anthropology. In considering this delineation of culture and of the science that studies its manifestations, questions immediately arise regarding the mutual bonds in the individual areas of the cultural complex. Is culture merely a common framework of techniques and practices applied in the life of a given society or does it integrate them into one whole? Should the theory that studies the individual cultural manifestations-be it cultural anthropology, ethnology or philosophy-always assume in its analysis that the place, role and function of these manifestations are in the end determined by the whole to which they belong as organic parts? In other words, should we search behind the extensive complex of cultural activities for a base that will allow us to consider it as an integrated and organic system?
The tradition based on J. G. Herder and developed especially in German thinking emphasizes the organic nature of culture. According to this understanding, culture is not only a complex but also, and above all, an organic whole. In regard to the interior, to the individual manifestations, techniques and activities, culture unites and allows the common basis to be identified. However, in regard to the exterior, when compared with culture of other societies and, indeed, with the whole of mankind, the culture differentiates and draws attention to the irreducible particularities. The culture that a given society lives in forms its own organic nature and delineates it out of the universal characteristics of humanity. As I. Berlin points out, the Herderian approach leads not only to an acceptance of the multiplicity of different human cultures, but also directly to the presumption of their incommensurability (Berlin 2000, 177) . From this point of view, culture is the whole that forms the boundary against universalism and uniformity.
This understanding that attributes an integrative and at the same time excluding role to culture must cope with the fact that in historical development neither integration nor differentiation ceases at the boundaries of a specific society. The reason for this is obvious: the elements that it cannot assimilate by means of its own schemes appear within it. As a result, in its core, culture differentiates and loses its unified character. Beyond the common framework, where the concept of culture offers to capture all the aspects and manifestations of the life of the society, a differentiated field of cultural levels is formed. Thus, opposites such as "higher" and "lower", "genuine" and "imported", "particular" and "ordinary or universal", and so on immerge in the cultural complex. It is understandable that theoretical reflections along these differentiating lines do not confine themselves to claiming that there is a weakening in the unified character of culture and a rise in plurality. As the opposites of "higher" and "lower" culture demonstrate on a linguistic level, the assertion of these differences is generally accompanied by normative judgments. Theoretical reflection on the disunion of culture prompts value questions, evokes concerns about the threats to the authentic values and then goes on to express the need to defend them. In situations where the totalizing concept of culture loses support in the social reality, the need to protect these authentic values gains support.
It is symptomatic that the defenders of a unified culture often express their attitudes in terms of philosophy. In this way philosophy is both a part of the cultural sphere and, at the same time, it is a place where its disunion is discussed before the need to restore union and integrity are considered.
As usually defined, philosophy belongs to the field of culture and it takes its place among other expressions. But as a place where culture is perceived and forms its role for human being and society, philosophy becomes a theory of culture.
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One of the ways in which philosophy approaches the role of capturing the pluralist character of culture and at the same time expresses the need for its unification is through the aestheticization of social reality. The value questions that are evoked by the coexistence of two cultures in one society are, in this way, realized through aesthetic judgments and extended to the conclusions concerning the whole society, its current state and prospects for further development.
This approach, that begins when attention is drawn to the existence of two cultures and then goes on to consider their aesthetic evaluation and ends by requiring a new social and political unification of that society on a common cultural basis, can be found in the reflections of the English philosopher, art critic and social reformer, John Ruskin.
In his lecture delivered in 1853 in Edinburgh, Ruskin showed his audience a picture of a simple window that can commonly be seen in the city: "a massy lintel of a single stone, laid across from side to side, with bold square-cut jambs-in fact, the simplest form it is possible to build" (Ruskin 1854, 3) . Then he asked the audience how many windows of this precise nature they supposed might be in the New Town of Edinburgh. Without waiting for the answer he continued: I have not counted them all through the town, but I counted them this morning along this very Queen Street, in which your Hall is; and on the one side of that street, there are of these windows, absolutely similar to this example, and altogether devoid of any relief by decoration, six hundred and seventy-eight (Ruskin 1854, 4 ).
Ruskin uses this example to support his fundamental critical thesis that modern architecture is dull and monotonous and cannot bear comparison with architectonic works of the past. In his opinion, modern architecture that produces simplicity and monotonousness has reached a stage where it cannot awake any aesthetic interest.
But is this reproachful attitude towards architecture legitimate, Ruskin asks afterwards, is it not its duty to be dull and monotonous by law? His answer to this question is a picture of a gothic window of an English domestic building built six hundred years ago. Who could deny that it is a pleasure to look at it? Ruskin uses the consequence of comparing works of modern and gothic architecture to introduce a broader perspective that allows him to move on from aesthetic evaluations to judgments on the state in which society presently finds itself. This way, the view of an aesthetician becomes the basis for diagnosing the whole of society. Ruskin believes that behind the differences in aesthetic qualities we shall not look for differences between the abilities of the creators: the architect who built the gothic window was no greater or wiser than the one who built this construction of dull and monotonous stones. The difference between the corresponding creations is the result of the diversion of modern architecture, and even the whole of society, away from natural shapes where beauty merges with firmness. According to Ruskin, the pointed arch is an example of this mergence. He affirms:
But there is a farther reason for our adopting the pointed arch than its being the strongest form; it is also the most beautiful form in which a window or door-head can be built. Not the most beautiful because it is the strongest; but most beautiful, because its form is one of those which, as we know by its frequent occurrence in the work of Nature around us, has been appointed by the Deity to be an everlasting source of pleasure to the human mind (Ruskin 1854, 10) .
The form of the pointed arch not only shows the superiority of gothic architecture over the modern architecture of the nineteenth century, it also brings a third level into the comparison, in which the natural shapes reveal the intentions of the highest creator by awaking feelings of pleasure.
It is obvious that we are no longer simply dealing with the aesthetic qualities of architecture. More precisely, it is through them that Ruskin is able to identify the symptoms of the social decline that arose in his times. These symptoms are equality, similitude and simplicity:
You know how fond modern architects, like foolish modern politicians, are of their equalities, and similarities; how necessary they think it that each part of a building should be like every other part. Now Nature abhors equality, and similitude, just as much as foolish men love them (ibid.).
In this way, the symptomatology of the social disease becomes a kind of etiology: the cause of the decline of modern society is to be found in the loss of the ties connecting society and Nature. By adopting a simple and uniform shape society has dissociated itself from the natural sources of its existence and lost the character of an organic whole. It was thanks to this organic character that beauty merged with purposefulness in its parts, whether they were utility objects or works of art.
According to this opinion, the disunion of culture reflects the loss of the organic basis that natural formations arise from. Beauty has two forms where perfection is to be found: one is the beauty of natural formations; the second is the beauty of gothic architecture. Ruskin posited the monotonous repetition of simple forms in modern architecture against the union of natural and architectonical beauty and in this contrast he found the opposition between organic unity and inorganic mechanical aggregation.
We can observe that in this interpretation the demand to overcome the disunion of culture becomes a demand to renew the basic ties between culture and nature. Ruskin does not intend to get stuck in romantic nostalgia over the lost beauty of the past; he wants to create a program of reform out of the demand for beauty. From diagnosis and etiology he moves on to the suggestion of therapy. He encourages his audience not to be romantic or utopist and declares resolutely that this is not his intention either. He affirms: Utopian they are not; for they are merely a proposal to do again what has been done for hundreds of years by people whose wealth and power were as nothing compared to ours;-and romantic they are not, in the sense of self-sacrificing or eminently virtuous, for they are merely the proposal to each of you that he should live in a handsomer house than he does at present, by substituting a cheap mode of ornamentation for a costly one (Ruskin 2007, 37) .
Using the fact that natural forms had already become a model for architecture over a long period of history, Ruskin tries to sustain the possibility that they may be reused.
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It is obvious that this attempt to shift the conclusion that Ruskin was driven to by an aesthete's approach to social reality, towards the project of a social reform is the least convincing part of his program. The development of the English society of the nineteenth century revealed how illusionary this idea of a return to beauty was. Ideas of social reform gradually separated away from aesthetic motivations and calls for return to beauty. That does not mean that the aesthete's approach itself lost its foundation and was no longer applied when identifying the two types of culture surviving in one and the same society. It was this approach that (among other things) allowed Adorno and Horkheimer in their work Dialectic of Enlightenment to reveal not only the character of modern mass culture but also the respective social and economical system where rationalized machine work procedures cause the decline of human creative abilities. In a society where the development of the machine has become that of machinery of control, a regression of the sensuous and intellectual abilities appears:
The regression of the masses lies in their inability to hear with their own ears what has not already been heard, to touch with their hands what has not previously been grasped; it is the new form of blindness which supersedes that of vanquished myth. Through the mediation of the total society, which encompasses all relationships and impulses, human beings are being turned back into precisely what the developmental law of society, the principle of the self had opposed; mere examples of the species, identical to one another through isolation within the compulsively controlled collectivity (Horkheimer, Adorno 2002, 29) .
Adorno and Horkheimer extend their line of thinking to warnings about the regression that is taking place in modern society. They affirm that in a society of the controlled collectivity, human beings are forced back to "more primitive anthropological stages" (Horkheimer, Adorno 2002, 28) . The mass culture that has spread throughout industrial society causes impoverishment of thought and experience and as a whole brings anthropological degradation.
The transformation of the world into industry and of culture into mass industry forced Adorno and Horkheimer to face a completely different reality than the one that worried Ruskin and his aesthetic feeling. In spite of all the differences to be found between Ruskin's reflections about modern architecture and the Dialectic of Enlightenment, both philosophical conceptions of culture contain a common aesthetic approach; Adorno and Horkheimer's conception of the Enlightenment and modern culture shows us that the resulting tendency that unwinds from this common point is anthropological regression. From this point of view, anthropology is no longer the theory of the whole culture but the diagnostics of the state at which when the culture was disunited and it brings disastrous consequences in the form of a division inside society reaching all the way to the loss of the basic function of providing opportunities for the development of human creative abilities. Thus, the anthropology of the regression is to be considered as a consequence of the idea of two cultures.
However, the anthropology of the regression is not the inevitable conclusion of all thinking that is based on a reflection upon the disunion of culture. There is an anthropology that does not deduce the diagnosis of regress out of the disunion of culture manifested in the dual nature of city. It considers diverse points of view. To explain this approach, let us first recall the opinions of the French theorist of urban culture Olivier Mongin. In his work Urban situation there is a section entitled "The city of a writer and the city of an engineer-urbanist" where he states the following about the primary opposition between two types of discourses on the city: "As far as the city is concerned, two antagonistic languages appear immediately. At least at the beginning it appears that there are the languages of the writer and poet on the one side and the discourse of the urbanist on the other" (Mongin 2005, 24) . As Mongin continues, the writers explore the city using their bodies and their pens: this way Borges and Sábato explored Buenos Aires, Mendoza Barcelona, Yonnet and Queneau Paris, Pessoa Lisbon and Pamuk Istanbul.
The difference between the two basic approaches to the city leads Mongin to the opposition of two conceptions that he explains through the distinction between place (lieu) and space (espace) as introduced by Michel de Certeau. Michel de Certeau is a French philosopher and anthropologist trained in history and psychoanalysis. In L'Invention du quotidien (The Practice of Everyday Life) he defines place as the order according to which the elements are distributed in relationships of coexistence. This order places one element next to another and in this way places them in their proper order, one that belongs to them alone. The organization of elements in places that are determined by one single order creates certain stability. Certeau states:
A space exists when one takes into consideration vectors of direction, velocities, and time variable. Thus space is composed of intersections of mobile elements. It is in a sense actuated by the ensemble of movements deployed within it. Space occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orient it, situate it, and make it function in polyvalent unity of conflictual programs or contractual proximities. On this view, in relation to place, space is like the word when it is spoken, that is, when it is caught in the ambiguity of an actualization, transformed into a term dependent upon many different conventions, satiates as the act of a present (or a time), and modified by the transformations caused by successive contexts (Certeau 1984, 117) .
The difference between place and space reflects determinations of two different approaches. In opposition to the theoretical, urbanistic understanding of the city based on the simultaneous order, stands the practical usage that changes a place to a space. Certeau points out not only the difference but also the possibility of transition occurring from one position to the other: space is used place. Or, in other words: "space is a practiced place" (Certeau 1984, 117) . Street determined geometrically by urbanism, is transformed into a space by pedestrians. Similarly, reading is a space that arises from the usage of place created by a system of signs, a written text.
The pair of opposites place/space is connected with the pair geometrical place/used place which again leads to the opposition of theory and practice. If we shift the opposites up to the level of opposition between theory and practice, we can assign representatives of a respective approach to both positions: against a theoretician there will be a practician, a user of the urban spaces, the constantly moving pedestrian whose relationship towards the city is created on the slabs of pavements. While the theoretician's language will be the clean, impersonal geometry of the cities, the discourse of the user of urban spaces captures practical experience.
In this way we have come from the dual nature of the city to the two viewpoints from which we can conceive the city. Certeau describes the transition from one to the other in an interesting way in his personal memory from New York. In his study Walking in the city (Marches dans la ville) he began with a description of Manhattan viewed from a point which has now become inaccessible. He describes his contemplation of Manhattan from the top of the World Trade Center. He has to confess that this view inspired in him a feeling of pleasure, the pleasure of a strange kind of voyeurism. In having the opportunity to contemplate the city as a whole, as a totality he felt he was in the position of the Almighty God. It was God's view of the city. And he was immediately aware that this pleasure and this feeling of power over the city were due to the fact that he had transcended the level of everyday life with its activity, noise and pollution.
He realized that the position of mastery, this position of power over the city is a construction whose seductive effects are paid for in omission and annihilation. We read:
[T]he panorama-city is a "theoretical" (that is, visual) simulacrum, in short a picture, whose condition of the possibility is an oblivion and misunderstanding of practices. The voyeurgod created by this fiction […] must disentangle himself from the murky intertwining daily behaviors and make himself alien to them (Certeau 1984, 93) .
As Certeau explains later that theoretical position and the corresponding "city" founded by urbanistic discourse is the result of a threefold operation.
The first step is the creation of a proper space consisting of formally structured elements. The rational space is rid of all the improper elements that are brought about by the myriad activities of everyday life.
The second step is the replacement of time as it is lived by individuals with non-time, the system of the synchronization of all elements.
And the third step is the construction of a universal and anonymous subject which is the city itself (see Certeau 1984, 94) .
As a result of this threefold operation we have the construction of a geometrical and rational city. It is a city of urbanists; it is the urbanist view of the city as described by Oliver Mongin. And political qualities and capacities can also be attributed to this construction.
Regardless of the feeling of pleasure and mastery provided by this construction, Michel de Certeau requires that there be a return to everyday practices and to their space, which is a practiced space. He wants to escape from the upper position that provides a totalized view of the city and go down to the level of the pavements, to the level of everyday activities with their unpredictability, distortions, deformations of the order, deviations from the standards or norm, with the opacity of the popular culture, and, at the same time, with their creativity and capacity to invent an unofficial way of living. His studies are characterized by the constant struggle to go beyond the official systems of production and to penetrate into the clouds of anti-systems of practices and manipulations. Certeau pays great attention to the activities of users and their "ways of using" imposed systems. According to him these ways of using represent resistance to the dominant economic, social and cultural systems. It is a mode of resistance, although in this case the resistance is not directed at the destruction of the imposed system, but at the transformation and appropriation of it.
On this view, in the pair producer/consumer, it is the second that Certeau focused his concerns on. But the consumer is a user and even a producer in that sense that he constantly transforms the prescribed systems by inventing the tactics for using them. His actions in fact deserve to be called productive and creative. They are simply a different kind of productivity and creativity. And the aim of this productive activity is the appropriation of the imposed system. Certeau wrote: "These ways of using represent enormous practices through which the users reappropriate the space organized by technologies of the social and cultural production" (Certeau 1984, XL) .
It seems clear that the terms appropriation and reappropriation are of utmost importance here. According to Certeau's conception, appropriation is achieved by subversive transformation, by ruse, desire and other individual tactics. As examples of these practices he mentions activities like walking, strolling, cooking, shopping but also poaching and cheating, which seek to transform and appropriate the imposed systems. These kinds of practices do not intend to directly destroy the imposed order. The nature of these tactics is rather characterized by the intention to invent ways of using this order and, within its framework, find ways of deviating from the imposed traces. Generally speaking, from this point of view the anthropology of spatial practices is focused on ways of appropriation.
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As we have seen, one of these spatial practices is walking. Through this activity we can transform the urban place into a space. Walking is the action of appropriating the city and in the chapter entitled "Walking in the City" Certeau studies this transformation.
Of course, Michel de Certeau is by no means the only one to stress the importance of walking for the appropriation of urban space. For example the Serbian architect, Bogdan Bogdanovic, described his method as follows: "My method was the Johnnie-Walker method… I'm actually convinced that one can read a city only as pedestrian, I would say, by my own heels" (Bogdanovic 2002, 17) . In Bogdanovic's work we can also find criticism of the urbanist view of the city. Bogdanovic constantly challenges the urbanist's role in shaping the urban space.
Looking back now on the description of the two cultures specified in the dual nature of the city, we can introduce some more precise characteristics relating to the point associated with the writer's reading of the city. As we understand now, this approach to the city is not limited to writers. Writers represent only one section of the whole group of persons who try to appropriate urban space through their practices. A common feature of their approaches to the city is the practitioner's point of view. In other words, they are all practitioners of the city and in various ways they try to appropriate its space.
It now seems that anthropology has to focus on this set of practices aimed at the appropriation of the urban space. But having said this, we are immediately confronted with the question: How is it possible to grasp all these varied and even heterogeneous activities in a theoretical way? On what theoretical basis they can be understood and explained? Bogdan Bogdanovic's method is suitable for reading a city but he has no ambition to do so on a theoretical basis.
Michel de Certeau's work can offer us, if not the answer, at least a hint as to how to answer this question. Having described these everyday practices in an ethnographic way, he began to articulate them theoretically. He found the foundation for this enterprise in the theory of speech acts. When he analyzed everyday practices and the way they used the systems he was well aware of how close these activities are to the speech acts studied in the framework of the performative theory of language. He draws a parallel between two pairs of terms. The relation between the officially prescribed systems of production and the everyday tactics of appropriation has its parallel in the relation between linguistic systems (code, grammar, norm, prescribed rules etc.) and the actual linguistic activity producing speech acts. From this point of view everyday practices like walking produce the same effects of alteration, transformation and appropriation as (on the level of language) do everyday linguistic practices, utterances, speech acts.
The common framework of these everyday linguistic operations is called rhetoric. The opposition between imposed systems and ways of using them corresponds then to the opposition between grammar and rhetorical use of language:
Whereas grammar watches over the propriety of terms, rhetorical alterations (metaphorical drifts, elliptical condensation, metonymic miniaturizations, etc.) point to the use of language by speakers in particular situations of ritual or actual linguistic combat (Certeau 1984, 39) .
What Certeau wants to introduce is a specific kind of rhetorics, the rhetorics of everyday practices exercised by users of the city.
Thus, parallels between ways of practice and linguistic activities are clearly identified: an active approach to the systems, a particular activity of alteration and appropriation. And Michel de Certeau openly affirms that thanks to these resemblances and parallels we can enlarge the field of speech act studies to the area of the whole culture.
When we descend from the upper plane offering a view of geometrical rationality we are confronted not only with a plurality of particular practices like walking, cooking, shopping or poaching, but also with a plurality of utterances produced each time in a particular situation. Thus, descending from the upper position brings us a considerable enlargement of the field where we can find mutually corresponding levels of activities. The activity of a pedestrian can now be seen as a special kind of speech act-Certeau uses the term "pedestrian speech acts" to describe this situation. What both walking and speaking share is the fact that both are parts of the process of appropriation. Certeau spells out this correspondence:
The act of walking is to the urban system what the speech act is to language or to the statements uttered. At the most elementary level, is has a triple 'enunciative' function: it is a process of appropriation of the topographical system on the part of the pedestrian (just as the speaker appropriates and takes on the language); it is a spatial acting-out of the place (just as the speech act is an acoustic acting-out of language); and it implies relations among differentiated positions, that is, among pragmatic 'contracts' in the form of movements (just as verbal enunciation is an 'allocution', 'posits another opposite' the speaker and puts contracts between interlocutors into action). It thus seems possible to give a preliminary definition of walking as a space of enunciation (Certeau 1984, 98) .
Considered from the rhetorical point of view, pedestrian practice is a way of appropriating the urban space.
This enlargement and this correspondence between walking and speaking, spatial and linguistic activities is not the last extension to be achieved by descending to the level of the pavement. In addition, and this is probably the most important benefit of this anthropological conception, we have the possibility of acquiring a suitable theoretical position for studying the phenomena of social and cultural life. The emphasis put on the activities directed at transforming the situation shows us that these studies have found a theoretical basis in the notion of performance.
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Let us remind ourselves of the starting point of our considerations, that is, the specific position of philosophy towards culture: philosophy is part of culture as well as a reflection of the whole complex. Consequently culture finds in philosophy its own, meta-cultural account. The examples mentioned above have shown us that the first result of this philosophical approach might be the diagnosis of the cultural split and symptoms of the anthropological regress. Behind the duality of culture this diagnosis reveals the regress and the loss of a fundamental anthropological capacity. However, as we have tried to show with the example of Certeau's analysis in the later parts of our paper, a philosophical approach that is based on noticing two cultures and studying their anthropological forms can also produce a different result. This alternative result is an anthropology that focuses on the activities of transforming and appropriating the prescribed social and cultural systems. This anthropology that emphasizes and studies the role of everyday performance practices belongs to the field of performance studies.
Of course, this general orientation needs to be specified and developed in the set of methodological considerations but there is no space to discuss it in more detail here. I confine myself to one of these methodological requirements: the claim of openness. Seen from this point of view, the cultural field is open by nature. Openness in this sense means not only the absence of borders and the opportunity to expand-this openness is both spatial and temporal. Above all, it shows us the principal and irremovable indeterminacy dwelling in the cultural space. Only a strictly ordered place can be under the control of determinist rules and prescriptions. The space of practices is constantly open to unpredictable development.
It is symptomatic that an awareness of openness is also now emerging in urbanist thought. One of the architects and urbanists to whom I can refer on this occasion is Christian de Portzmaparc. In an interview this French architect argues: "We have to consider the future as unknown and uncertain" (Portzamparc 2002, 22) . According to him, this acknowledgement of uncertainness is what distinguishes Age II (in terms of modern urbanism) from Age III in the development of the city. The city of Age III is principally open.
Of course, this urbanist acceptance of the anthropological idea that the future is always uncertain and open to transformation has its consequences. And among these consequences we cannot dismiss the danger of pollution or contamination with improper elements. It is clear that this danger is inherent within the openness. Once we have an open urban, social and cultural space we must accept the impact of contamination of this kind. This constant process that confronts us can be called balkanization. I know very well that the term balkanization is often used to describe the process of fragmentation and the loss of a common basis to cultural and social life. The inevitable effect of balkanization is then that the country becomes divided into several closed communities. Obviously, this state is far from a state of openness, rather it is one of separation and enclosure. I would like to propose a different, quite positive understanding of balkanization for anthropological studies-one that is inspired by the idea that Paul Veyne developed in his study Did the Greeks Believe in their Myths? Veyne speaks of the "social diversity of beliefs and mental balkanization" (Veyne 1988, 41-58) . I hope we can extend this inspiration to the anthropology of contemporary culture and use the term balkanization to designate the cultural coexistence of elements that are by nature heterogeneous in origin and finality. The above-mentioned openness brings an opportunity for such coexistence to emerge. And it also provides an opportunity for philosophical reflection on the flux of inventions, transformations and appropriations in the cultural field. 1
